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The study of economic growth is central to macroeconomics. More than anything else, macroecon-
omists are concerned with finding policies that encourage growth. And by ‘growth’, they mean the 
growth of real GDP. This measure has become so central to macroeconomics that few economists 
question its validity. Our intention here is to do just that. 
We argue that real GDP is a deeply flawed metric. It is presented as an objective measure of 
economic scale. But when we look under the surface, we find crippling subjectivity. Moreover, few 
economists seem to realize that real GDP is based on a non-existent quantum – utility. In light of 
these problems, it seems to us that much of macroeconomics needs to be rethought. 
 
1. Calculating Real GDP 
 
Macroeconomists entertain two related measures of GDP: nominal GDP, which is the total money 
value of goods and services produced in an economy in a given period (say a year); and real GDP, 
which is the total quantity of these same goods and services.  
The challenge for macroeconomists is that the ‘quantity’ of goods and services – and therefore 
real GDP – cannot be aggregated directly. Since goods and services are qualitatively different, econ-
omists cannot sum their quantities in their natural units (try adding 10 lb of tomatoes to two laptops 
to five financial services). While each commodity bundle has its own quantity, these quantities are 
incommensurable.  
Fortunately, there is a simple way around this difficulty – or so say the macroeconomists. To 
understand their solution, we need to backtrack a bit. Unlike real GDP, nominal GDP can be readi-
ly calculated in universal money terms. If the price of a commodity i is 𝑃𝑖 and its quantity is 𝑄𝑖, then 
its money value 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖. Aggregating the money values across all 𝑛 commodities produced in 
the economy gives us nominal GDP: 
 
1. 𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
As Equation 1 makes clear, over time nominal GDP can grow or contract for two reasons: (1) 
because quantities change (through greater or lesser production), and (2) because prices change (via 
inflation or deflation). And here, say the macroeconomists, lies the solution: if we ‘purge’ nominal 
GDP from the effect of inflation and deflation, we end up with real GPD.  
This purging is technically straightforward. Instead of multiplying each commodity by its current 
money price 𝑃𝑖 (which changes from year to year), we multiply it by the price prevailing in a particu-
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lar ‘base year’ 𝑃𝑏𝑖. In this calculation, prices are always the same, by definition. And since the only 
things that change now are the quantities being produced, we end up with real GDP denominated in 
base-year prices: 
 
2. 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ 𝑄𝑖 × 𝑃𝑏𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
2. Which Base Year? 
 
But there is a slight conceptual problem. It turns out that the growth of real GDP – ostensibly a sin-
gle, objective quantity – is highly sensitive to our choice of base year.  
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical economy that produces only two commodities: 1,000 lb of 
tomatoes and two laptops. Next, let’s choose 1990 as our base year and assume that tomatoes in that 
year cost $2/lb while a laptop costs $2,000. In this case, real GDP, denominated in 1990 dollars, 
would be $6,000 (=1,000 × $2 + 2 × $2,000). Now, skip to 1991 and imagine that, in that year, the 
economy grows by producing one additional laptop. This increase means that real GDP in 1991, 
denominated in 1990 prices, is $8,000 (=1,000 × $2 + 3 × $2,000). Compared to 1990, real GDP 
grew by 33.3 per cent. 
So far so good. Now, instead of using 1990 as our base year, let’s use 1991. Production levels 
remain unchanged: 1,000 tomatoes and 2 laptops in 1990, and 1,000 tomatoes and 3 laptops in 1991. 
Base-year prices, though, are no longer the same: in 1991, our newly chosen base year, tomato prices 
double to $4/lb, while laptop prices are halved to $1,000. Under these new conditions, real GDP for 
1990, this time denominated in 1991 dollars, is $6,000 (=1,000 × $4 + 2 × $1,000), while real GDP 
for 1991, also in 1991 dollars, is $7,000 (=1,000 × $4 + 3 × $1,000). Unlike before, in this example 
real growth is only 17 per cent. 
In other words, real GDP is affected not only by the actual quantities being produced, but also by 
our choice of base year. And since there are numerous base years to choose from, the same real GDP 
can end up having many different magnitudes!1  
 
3. Inherent, Irreducible Uncertainty  
 
The base-year problem logically means that there is uncertainty in real GDP. Because relative com-
modity prices change from year to year, each base year will generate a different measure of real 
GDP. And since there is no way to determine which base-year measure is ‘correct’, the choice is al-
ways arbitrary. This arbitrariness leaves us with inherent, irreducible measurement uncertainty.  
Here is the curious thing: economists do not report this uncertainty. Scientists know that meas-
urement uncertainty must be reported. The uncertainty indicates the confidence in the measure. The 
larger the uncertainty, the less confident we are. If we do not report uncertainty, we are not telling 
the truth to other scientists. We make our measure appear certain when it is not. Although econo-
mists are aware of the base-year problem (it is taught to undergraduates), one will never find an offi-
cial measure of the uncertainty in real GDP growth data. The government publishes only one meas-
ure of real GDP, with no reported uncertainty.  
                                                          
1 For visual illustrations of the base-year effect, see Nitzan and Bichler (2009: Ch. 8), Bichler and Nitzan (2015) and Fix 
(2019: Section 2.2). 
3 
In a recent paper, Blair Fix (2019) estimates the uncertainty in real GDP resulting from the base-
year problem. To reiterate, this uncertainty is caused by instability in relative prices. Over the long 
term, this instability is spectacular. Figure 1A shows the divergent price change of 10 selected com-
modities from the US Consumer Price Index. Figure 1B shows the price change of all CPI commodi-
ties. Figure 1C shows the resulting uncertainty in real GDP growth – about 30 per cent since 1947.2  
 
 
Figure 1: Divergent Price Change and Divergent Measures of Real GDP 
 
This figure was first published in Fix (2019). It shows how divergent changes in price affect the measurement of US real 
GDP. Panel A shows historical price changes in ten selected commodities tracked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Panel 
B shows divergent price change for all CPI commodities. Divergent price change means that the choice of base year has a 
strong effect on the measurement of real GDP growth, as shown in Panel C. For sources and methods, see the Appendix in 
Fix (2019). 
 
                                                          
2 Note that this estimated range of uncertainty assumes that at least one of the years since 1947 was a ‘correct’ base year. 
However, if that assumption is false – in other words, if the ‘correct’ set of relative prices was never mirrored in prevailing 
market prices – the range of possible real GDP measures can be much wider. Worse still, if we reject the very notion that 
there is a ‘correct’ set of relative prices to start with, estimating the uncertainty range becomes impossible if not totally 
meaningless. The best we can do, then, is speak of a ‘possibility space’ for real GDP, defined by the range of subjective 
measurement choices. 
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Curiously, the official measure of real GDP is right at the upper range of this uncertainty. Is this a 
coincidence? Or have government statisticians simply chosen the method that yields the maximum 
growth (so as to appease their superiors)? This is an important question that, as far as we know, re-
mains uninvestigated.  
 
4. Chain-Weighting the Base-Year Problem  
 
To reiterate, the base-year problem leads to uncertainty in the calculation of real GDP. But instead 
of openly reporting this uncertainty, government economists have devised a ‘fix’. Rather than using 
a single base year, they ‘chain’ together many adjacent base years. This is a bit like a moving aver-
age. They calculate the growth of real GDP between consecutive years, using the first year as the 
base, and then ‘chain’ together the resulting growth measures to calculate real GDP levels. This 
method claims to ‘fix’ or at least lessen the base-year problem. It doesn’t. 
The appeal of chain-weighting, according to economists, is that it gets closer to their theoretical 
ideal. According to this ideal, the weight of each commodity in real GDP is provided by its ‘true’ or 
‘natural’ price. When using a single base year, the implicit assumption is that relative prices in that 
base year are ‘true’ and therefore constitute the ‘correct’ weights (Equation 2). However, if the ‘cor-
rect’ weights change over time, and if these changes are mirrored in the movement of relative market 
prices, we can do better by changing the base year more often (every year) and chain-weight the re-
sults.  
This argument is superficially convincing, but it falls apart on further inspection. Chaining to-
gether base years is better than using a fixed base year only if the ‘true’ weights indeed change over 
time, and only if ‘truth’ here is indeed revealed by relative market prices. Unfortunately, there is no 
way to ascertain either ‘if’. And as long as these two ‘ifs’ remain hanging – which might be forever – 
chain-linked measures must be deemed as arbitrary as their fixed-based cousins. 
The only solution to the base-year problem would be if prices were stable. But since we cannot 
change history, this solution is unattainable.3 
 
5. Unknowable Unknowns: Quality Change 
 
And this is just the tip of the iceberg. Lurking underneath the base-year issue is a far bigger problem 
– the measurement of quality change. And unlike the base-year problem, the scope of the quality-
change problem is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate quantitatively. 
When measuring price change, economists attempt to adjust for changes in the quality of a 
commodity. An increase in the quality of a commodity is recorded as an increase the quantity of real 
GDP. So if computers get 10 times better, then computer output is recorded as increasing by a factor 
of 10.  
And here arises the question: how do we measure quality change? Before diving into the specifics, 
we should recognize that there is little agreement on this topic. The governments of the world use 
different methods, and the result is wildly different measures of quality change.  
                                                          
3 One of us (Fix) recently engaged in a lengthy debate with an (anonymous) economist who defended the practice of chain-
weighting GDP. The exchange can be found on the capitalaspower.com forum: 
http://www.capitalaspower.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=505 
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Take computers. Figure 2 shows the different measures of computer quality change used by eight 
different OECD countries. Now, to a first approximation, computers are the same everywhere. So 
these different measures reveal nothing about the actual change in computer quality. They are just 
an artefact of the different methods being used. If we project these different quality-change measures 
over 30 years, the divergence is spectacular. Assuming no change in the underlying number of com-
puters produced, we find a 1,000-fold disparity in the growth of computer output across the different 
countries. Clearly, we have a problem.  
 
 
Figure 2: Divergent Measures of Computer Quality Change 
 
This figure was first published in Fix (2019). It illustrates the dispersion in national estimates of computer quality change. 
Panel A shows computer quality change estimates for eight OECD nations. Bars represent the average annual growth rate 
of computer quality between 1995 and 2001. Panel B shows how these quality-change measurements would affect the 
growth of computer ‘output’ over 30 years. Assuming the number of computers produced remains the same in each year, 
the different quality adjustments lead to divergent measures of computer output growth spanning three orders of magni-
tude. 
 
 
The problem is that measuring quality change requires numerous subjective decisions. There are 
so many such decisions, in fact, that it is virtually impossible to keep track of the ways that quality 
changes affect the measure of real GDP.  
Natural scientists have the concept of ‘error propagation’. In each step of analysis, we have un-
certainty in our measurement. To keep track of this uncertainty, we ‘propagate’ it through our calcu-
lation. If economists were serious scientists dealing with an objective reality, they would do the same 
with real GDP. Each time they made a subjective decision about how to measure quality change, 
they would keep track of the results that would have occurred if other choices had been made. This 
would give a possibility space for the range of possible measures of real GDP. 
How large is this possibility space? We have no idea. In fact, since quality is partly subjective, 
this space might be undefinable (more on this below). But even if it can be defined, governments re-
port only one measure of quality change. It is thus virtually impossible to know how alternative 
ways of measuring quality change would affect the measure of real GDP growth. This is an ‘un-
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knowable unknown’. At present, there is no way to estimate the uncertainty in real GDP that results 
from different ways of measuring quality change. And not only can we not answer this question, but 
most macroeconomists are not even interested in asking it. To ask the question is to admit the arbi-
trary nature of real GDP. 
 
6. The Unasked Question: What is the Unit of Real GDP? 
 
Most economists believe that ‘constant dollars’ – i.e. dollars expressed in fixed prices of a given year – 
are the unit of real GDP. For instance, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports that real GDP 
has units of ‘Chained 2012 Dollars’. Unfortunately, this belief is false – or, worse still, meaningless. 
It is logically untenable when we reflect on the methods that go into measuring real GDP.  
As soon as we start ‘adjusting’ for quality change, we are no longer using prices as the unit of 
analysis. Instead, we are appealing to some other unit – the unit of quality that is hidden in the com-
modity. What is this unit? It is utility – the quantity of pleasure that consumers derived from a com-
modity. Here is the US Bureau of Labor Statistics describing how ‘hedonic’ adjustments appeal to 
‘utility’ to measure quality change:  
 
In price index methodology, hedonic quality adjustment has come to mean the practice of 
decomposing an item into its constituent characteristics, obtaining estimates of the value of 
the utility derived from each characteristic, and using those value estimates to adjust prices 
when the quality of a good changes. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010) 
  
The problem is that this utilitarian approach is built on foundations of sand. Utility, even if it 
were commensurable across individuals, is unobservable directly. But economists are not deterred. 
They hypothesize that prices reveal the utility of a commodity. They then use prices to estimate the 
utility embodied in each characteristic of the commodity. This method allows them, or so they 
think, to measure quality change. 
Unfortunately, the whole operation is circular. And when we look at the logic closely, it is inde-
fensible. Prices are taken to reveal the utility of a commodity. But having made this assumption, we 
then find that prices change through time. This means that nominal prices cannot be trusted to re-
veal utility. So we have to ‘correct’ for price change to measure the ‘true’ change in utility. But we 
make this correction by appealing to prices – the very unit we just rejected. The logic is torturous 
when stated clearly.  
In reality, economists never get close to measuring utility. Instead, their hedonic quality adjust-
ment is an arbitrary algorithm for calculating quality change. It is based on a host of subjective deci-
sions. These include the choice of the relevant characteristics of the commodity, the choice of func-
tional form of the hedonic regression used to weigh these characteristics and the choice of the cross-
section method. Different assumptions will yield different measures of quality change. And there is 
no way to know which measure, if any, is ‘correct’.  
As a PhD student, Jonathan Nitzan wrote a paper pointing out these difficulties in quality-
change measurement (Nitzan 1989). But he found that the paper was unpublishable. He was scolded 
by reviewers. ‘These problems have been solved’, they said. Unfortunately, the supposed ‘solutions’ 
remain unknown to us, some 30 years later. In fact, we think that the problems are unsolvable. 
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Economists assume that utility is the unit of quality. But this unit is unobservable – or put more 
strongly, it is non-existent (Nitzan and Bichler 2009) . 
To summarize, whether openly or tacitly, the methods used for quality-change adjustment take 
the true unit of real GDP to be utility. To justify measuring aggregate utility, economists need a host 
of assumptions. These are:  
 
(a) All consumers must be identical. This identity ascertains that utilities are commensurable and 
substitutable, and that the quantities of commodities, measured in utility, are independent of 
whoever happens to own them. 
 
(b) Consumer preferences must be independent of income, so that a redistribution of income from 
poorer to richer consumers, or vice versa, will not alter the utility generated by a given array of 
goods and services. 
 
(c) Preferences must remain temporally fixed to ascertain that, over time, a given array of goods and 
services will yield the same measure of ‘real GDP’. 
 
(d) All markets must be in a perfectly competitive equilibrium to ascertain that prices reflect the un-
derlying utilities; alternatively, economists must know the ‘correct’ prices that would have pre-
vailed had markets been in a perfectly competitive equilibrium.  
 
Since assumptions (a), (b), (c) and (d) are never satisfied, the resulting measures of ‘real GDP’ 
are meaningless. In our view, the correct acronym for ‘real GDP’ should be AWUGDU – pro-
nounced ‘a-woogdoo’. It stands for ‘Arbitrarily Weighted Unquantifiable Gross Domestic Utility’. 
  
7. Solutions: Differential Measures for Prices and Biophysical Measures for Scale  
 
If real GDP is largely meaningless, as we have argued, the result is a conceptual void that fundamen-
tally undermines the field of macroeconomics. It means there is no single measure of economic out-
put on which to build a theory of economic growth. Consequently, much of macroeconomics must 
be questioned. 
If we discard real GDP, then what are the alternatives?  
We propose two different approaches. First, if we are interested in prices, then there is no need to 
use inflation-adjusted metrics. We can simply compare the price of one commodity to the price of 
another. We call this a ‘differential’ measure. Nitzan and Bichler (2009) have proposed a theory of 
capitalism that appeals only to differential measures. They call it capital as power, or CasP for short. 
The idea is that, as capitalism advances and spreads, the relative prices of owned commodities re-
flect the power structure of society. When we study differential prices such as those of Amazon’s 
stock relative to Apple’s, we are implicitly studying the relative power of the owners of these two 
companies.  
Regardless of whether one accepts this ‘capital as power’ hypothesis, differential prices can be 
studied objectively. But we must be sure that, whenever possible, we use actual nominal prices, not 
the price indexes reported by statistical agencies (since these contain subjective quality-change ad-
justments). 
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Second, if we are interested in the overall scale of the economy we can use biophysical measures. 
Fix (2015b, 2015a) has argued that energy use is an important measure of economic scale. Keen, 
Ayres and Standish (2019) have recently reiterated this idea. The laws of thermodynamics dictate 
that energy is essential for sustaining complex systems. Its necessity makes it a prime candidate for 
measuring economic scale.  
Energy use can help us scientifically define the boundaries of production, as well as to assess the 
impact of that production on the biosphere. Note, however, that we do not equate more energy use 
with a better quality of life. More energy use is simply more energy use. To measure the quality of life 
– and human wellbeing more generally – we need a new accounting system altogether. This system must 
be based not on neoclassical notions of perfect competition and individual utility, but on a democrat-
ic articulation of what constitutes the ‘good life’ and a ‘good society’ within our broader biosphere.  
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